Antitrust Regulation—Inclusion of Substitute Products Within the Relevant Market, United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377 (1956) by unknown
Washington University Law Review 
Volume 1957 Issue 1 
January 1957 
Antitrust Regulation—Inclusion of Substitute Products Within the 
Relevant Market, United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 
351 U.S. 377 (1956) 
Follow this and additional works at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview 
 Part of the Antitrust and Trade Regulation Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Antitrust Regulation—Inclusion of Substitute Products Within the Relevant Market, United States v. E.I. du 
Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377 (1956), 1957 WASH. U. L. Q. 74 (1957). 
Available at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1957/iss1/9 
This Case Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School at Washington University Open 
Scholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington University Law Review by an authorized 
administrator of Washington University Open Scholarship. For more information, please contact 
digital@wumail.wustl.edu. 
COMMENTS
ANTITRUST REGULATION-INCLUSION OF SUBSTITUTE PRODUCTS
WITHIN THE RELEVANT MARKET
United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377 (1956)
Defendant, producing seventy-five per cent of the cellophane pro-
duced in the United States,1 was charged with monopolizing interstate
commerce in cellophane in violation of section 2 of the Sherman Anti-
trust Act.2 After making an extensive market analysis, the district
court found that cellophane was in active competition with other flex-
ible wrapping materials, and ruled that the relevant market for cello-
phane consisted of the market for such materials. Upon further find-
ing that cellophane accounted for less than twenty per cent of the flex-
ible wrapper market, the district court held that the defendant did not
have the requisite market control to constitute a monopoly.3 In affirm-
ing, the Supreme Court stated that the relevant market for determin-
ing the existence of a monopoly-the power to control prices or ex-
clude competition-consists of those products which are "reasonably
interchangeable" by consumers for the same purpose.4
Although decisions prior to 1945 involving alleged violations of sec-
tion 25 contain an abundance of language identifying monopolies with
1. The remainder of the cellophane production was accounted for by the Syl-
vania and Olin companies. The former was licensed to produce cellophane by
defendant after Sylvania began to test the validity of defendant's moisture proof
cellophane patent. Olin was allowed to produce cellophane after the principal case
was instituted in the lower court. Stocking & Mueller, The Cellophane Case and
the New Competition, 45 Am. EcoN. REv. 29, 41-44 (1955).
2. 26 STAT. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1952), the pertinent provisions of which
are, "Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or
conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or
commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed
guilty of a misdemeanor .... )
The government, however, did not charge the defendant with a misdemeanor
under § 2, but instead brought a civil action under § 4 seeking an injunction
against the alleged violations and also divesture for the purpose of removing the
effect of monopolization. Section 4 provides: "The several district courts of the
United States are invested with jurisdiction to prevent and restrain violations of
sections 1-7 .... " 26 STAT. 209-10 (1890), 15 U.S.C. § 4 (1952).
3. United States v. E. I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 118 F. Supp. 41 (D. Del.
1953). The defendant was also charged under § 2 with attempting and conspiring
to monopolize interstate commerce. Although the district court found for defend-
ant on all issues, the government appealed only from the ruling that defendant
had not monopolized the cellophane trade.
4. United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377 (1956).
Determination of the relevant market also requires a geographical delimitation.
For examples, see United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495 (1948)
(delimited to an eleven-state area); United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S.
218 (1947) (delimited to a four-city area). In the principal case the geographical
market was nationwide. United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., supra
at 395.
5. The vast majority of cases involved alleged violations of both § 1 and § 2.
Very few cases have considered § 2 separately. Rostow, The New Sherman Act:
A Positive Instrument of Progress, 14 U. Cm. L. REV. 567, 575 (1947).
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control of the market, there was generally little examination of perti-
nent economic data on which to base a determination of the degree of
market control.6 While indications of market control must have influ-
enced judges,' courts tended to emphasize restriction of competition"
or abuse of corporate power" in determining whether there had been a
violation of the Sherman Act. As a result of the paucity of economic
analysis of the market during this earlier period, there was a cor-
responding lack of analysis of the problem of inclusion or exclusion of
"substitute products" within the relevant marketl'--the courts tended
simply to exclude those products which were physically distinguishable
from the defendant's product.', The essence of this problem is whether
to delimit the market to physically identical or fungible products only,
or whether to include alternative products which are in competition
with the alleged monopolist's product, i.e., those products which con-
sumers will readily "substitute" for the product allegedly monopoliz-
ing the market.
A notable exception to the approach of the courts during this earlier
period is United States v. Corn Products Refining Co.12 Decided in 1916
by Judge Learned Hand, this case was unique both for its extensive ex-
amination of market data and for its treatment of substitute prod-
ucts.' The case involved both identical and physically distinguishable
products, and established two guides for their inclusion or exclusion
from the market: (1) identical products were to be included only if
produced on a cost basis comparable to that of the alleged monopolist's
product, and (2) physically distinguishable products, if produced on a
comparable cost basis, were to be included if consumer preferences
6. Mason, Monopoly in Law and Economics, 47 YALE L.J. 34, 41 (1937). The
conclusions reached in this article as to the divdrgence of legal and economic
concepts of monopoly were subsequently modified by Professor Mason. See Mason,
The Current Status of the Monopoly Problem in the United States, 62 HARv. L.
Ri:\. 1265, 1272 (1949).
7. Ihi.; Levi, TIe Antitrust Laws and Monopoly, 14 U. CHI. L. REV. 153, 160
(1947).
8. Mason, Monopoly in Law and Economics, 47 YALE L.J. 34 passim (1937).
!). Practically speaking, until a comparatively recent date the abuse theory was
followed in the application of the Sherman Act. That is, the successful competitor
who succeeded in becoming the sole occupier of the field was regarded as a
monopolist only if he abused his privilege to compete freely "by conduct outside
the normal methods of business or by charging exorbitant prices.... ." Levi, supra
note 7, at 157, and cases cited. See Turner, Antitrust Policy and the Cellophane
Ca.e, 70 HAR'. L. REv. 281, 289 (1956).
Wo. The only case prior to United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d
416 (2d Cir. 1945), giving extensive treatment to product substitutes within the
relevant market was United States v. Corn Products Refining Co., 234 Fed.
964 (S.D.N.Y. 1916), appeal dismissed on appellant's motion, 249 U.S. 621 (1921).
See Turner, supra note 9, at 288,
11. Turner, supra note 9, at 289; Macdonald, Product Competition in the Rele-
vant Market Under the Sherman Act, 53 MicH. L. REv. 69, 73 (1954).
12. 234 Fed. 964 (S.D.N.Y. 1916), appeal dismissed on appellant's motion, 249
U.S. 621 (1921).
3. See note 10 supra.
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indicated that the products were in competition.14 The court reasoned
that where production costs differ the corporation with the lower cost
basis could control prices within the differential, and to that extent,
even though limited, constituted a monopoly.' 5 This decision was the
forerunner of United States v. Aluminum Co. of America'0 which was
decided in 1945-the opinion again being written by Judge Learned
Hand. In Alcoa Judge Hand delimited the relevant market for alumi-
num and in so doing excluded imported aluminum-a physically iden-
tical product. The court was of the opinion that within the limits of
the tariff and transportation costs the defendant was free to raise its
prices as it chose 7 -thus echoing the "limited monopoly" of the Corn
Products case.'8 "Secondary" aluminum-a physically distinguishable
product-was also excluded although found to be in competition with
"virgin" aluminum. The court reasoned that since defendant con-
trolled the output of "virgin" aluminum, it also controlled the quantity
of "secondary" aluminum with which the "virgin" would compete in
the future.19 Both the Corn Products and Alcoa cases considered ex-
tensive economic data in determining market control, and in delimit-
ing the relevant market for identical products relied on the cost basis
as the criterion. In its delimitation of the relevant market for phys-
ically distinguishable products, the Corn Products case was consistent
in utilizing this criterion in conjunction with the requirement that the
products be in competition as indicated by consumer preferences. The
Alcoa case, on the other hand, departed from this approach in its ex-
clusion of "secondary" aluminum; both the cost factor and the fact
that "virgin" and "secondary" aluminum were in competition were
ignored. The court emphasized what appears to be a practical con-
sideration-since defendant controlled the output of "virgin" alumi-
num, it controlled the quantity of "secondary" aluminum produced.
The Alcoa case marked the beginning of a trend of decisions em-
phasizing the significance of market control.20 As a result of this
14. See note 12 supra, at 974-77; Turner, supra note 9, at 288.
15. See note 12 supra, at 975.
16. 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945). The Alcoa case was originally appealed to the
Supreme Court, but due to the lack of a quorum of six justices qualified to hear
the case, it was referred to the second circuit for final disposition. Id. at 421. The
Supreme Court, however, has gone out of its way to approve of this decision. See
United States v. American Tobacco Co., 328 U.S. 781, 811-15 (1946).
17. 148 F.2d at 426.
18. See text supported by note 15 supra.
19. 148 F.2d at 423-26. The court's reasoning has been criticized on the theory
that it is very doubtful that Alcoa would have controlled its output of "virgin"'
aluminum and thereby sacrificed profits for the purpose of controlling the amount
of competitive scrap which would appear on the market at some later date. Mason,
The Current Status of the Monopoly Problem in the United States, 62 HARv. L.
Rnv. 1265, 1273-74 (1949).
20. The early cases under § 2 seemed to follow the rule that "size alone does
not determine guilt," but required that there also be wrongful intent, some restric-
tion of competition, or coercive practices by the corporation. United States v.
Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 429 (2d Cir. 1945); Adams, The "Rule
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emphasis there has been increased examination and analysis of eco-
nomic data to determine the relevant market, a concomitant of which
has been increased consideration given the problem of including sub-
stitute products within that market. However, while the decisions
subsequent to Alcoa undertook exhaustive market analysis, the Court
was not faced with the grand scale of possible market substitutes as
in the principal case, and further, no additional tools of analysis were
presented to the Court prior to the principal case to serve as guides in
delimiting the relevant market.21 One case, Times-Picayune Publish-
"t Refiion": Workable Competition or Workable Monopoly? 63 YALE L.J. 348,352 (1954). It is now argued that the Alcoa decision, in its sudden change of
emphasis to the degree of market control, sets forth the proposition that size
alone may constitute a violation of § 2, and that the intent to monopolize will
be inferred from the attainment of the monopoly power unless the defendant can
show that the power was "thrust upon it," i.e., that the monopoly simply resulted
from superior business skills. Under this view it has been stated that the Alcoa
case has given a new birth to the Sherman Act. Rostow supra note 5 passim.
See Rostow, Monopoly Under the New Sherman Act: Power or Purpose? 43
ILL. L. REV. 745 (1949). See also United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334
U.S. 495, 534 (1948) (dissenting opinion); Adams, supra at 353; Oppenheim,
Federal Antitrust Legislation: Guideposts to a Revised National Antitrust Policy,
50 MICH. L. Rnv. 1139, 1193 (1952); Schwartz, The Schwartz Dissent, 1 ANTI-
TRUST BULL. 37, 38-40 (1955). Consequently, if the courts are now willing to find
that the existence of a monopoly, i.e., the power to control prices and exclude com-
petition, is itself a violation of § 2 without requiring proof of abusive practices,
it is acutely necessary to delimit accurately the relevant market. Professor Ros-
tow's views have caused a great deal of controversy and have been rejected by
some who contend that the Sherman Act does not prohibit size-that the mere
existence of monopolistic power is not an offense. This group maintains that
there must be some evidence of abuse or misuse of this power, or that the defend-
ant intended to misuse it. Johnston & Stevens, Monopoly or Monopolization-
a Reply to Profe,"or Rostow, 44 ILL. L. Rm. 269 (1949); Robbins, "Bigness," The
Sherm ia Act, and Antitrust Policy, 39 VA. L. Rm,. 907 (1953).
It is submitted, however, that the increased emphasis by the Court upon the
degree of market control may not be attributed so much to a change of philosophy
toward antitrust prosecutions as to a different type of case coming before the
courts. In the earlier cases the courts could easily find abusive practices by the cor-
poration as a peg upon which to hang their decisions. It has been stated that courtsdid this because of the extreme difficulty of developing rules for determining
market control. Mason, supra note 8, at 45. Modern corporations, however, with
their large legal staffs have become much more sophisticated and do not conduct
themselves in such notorious fashion. Consequently, the courts are being forced
to examine the degree of market control to determine whether there is a monopoly
in the first instance before deciding whether the corporation is guilty of monopoli-
zation under § 2. It should also be noted that as corporations become more
"mannerly" in their conduct, the courts will be increasingly forced to decide the
issue whether size alone constitutes monopolization under § 2, or whether it
requires size plus abusive practices.
It was unnecessary for the Court in the principal case to decide whether size
alone constitutes a violation of the Sherman Act since it held that defendant was
not a monopoly. The lower court had held that even if defendant were a
monopoly, it was not subject to prosecution because the acquisition of itspower was protected by patents, and further, that the power had been acquired
through defendant's business skill. As stated by the Supreme Court, a finding
that defendant was not a monopoly obviated any necessity of deciding these issues.
351 U.S. at 381.
21. See United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495 (1948); United
States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 166-67 (1948). In the former
case the Court extensively considered the problem of including rolled steel prod-
ucts and plate and shape steel products within the relevant market. Both were
included following a purely factual examination of their comparative uses. The
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1957/iss1/9
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ing Co. v. United States,22 did suggest in a footnote that since all
products have substitutes, an examination of the cross-elasticity of
demand for those products would be useful in determining which
products were to be included within the relevant market. This appears
to be the first case suggesting that an economist's method of analysis
would be used to solve the problem of substitute products within the
relevant market.
In determining the existence of a monopoly, i.e., the power to con-
trol price and competition within the market, the principal case has
continued the trend emphasizing examination of economic data to de-
termine the degree of market control,23 and is the first case attempting
to utilize the economist's method of analysis in solving the problem
of product substitutes within the relevant market. The Court stated
that in examining the economic data for the purpose of determining
which product substitutes shall be included in the relevant market, it
is necessary to appraise the cross-elasticity of demand in the trade, 24
and further stated that that part of trade or relevant market over
which there is an alleged monopoly was to include those products
which have "reasonable interchangeability for the purposes for which
they are produced-price, use and qualities considered. 2 5 After em-
phasizing the similarities of use and quality between cellophane and
other wrapping materials, the Court stated that an indication of
cross-elasticity of demand was a responsiveness of sales of one prod-
uct to price changes in the other. The fact that a decrease in the
price of cellophane caused buyers to switch to it was considered by
the Court as an indication that a high cross-elasticity of demand
existed between cellophane and other wrapping materials. 20 Pursuant
to these findings the Court delimited the relevant market to flexible
wrapping materials, rather than merely cellophane, and concluded
that defendant did not possess a monopoly. 27
Court in the latter case held that "first-run" showing of films was a distinct
market from "second-run" showings. No market analysis was undertaken, appar-
ently because "first-run" showings were obviously the "cream of the business."
For a summary of the developments between the Alcoa decision and the principal
case, see Turner, supra note 9, at 292-96.
22. 345 U.S. 594, 612 n.31 (1953).
23. Judge Leahy in the lower court opinion stated that, "Need for market
analysis is the teaching of every major monopoly power case since Judge Hand's
Alcoa decision." 118 F. Supp. at 197.
24. 351 U.S. at 394.
25. Id. at 404. It is not clear whether the Court set up two tests for determin-
ing the relevant market, namely, reasonable interchangeability and cross-elasticity
of demand, or whether the latter was encompased by the former. Logically, it
would seem the determination of the relevant market requires two steps: first, a
delimitation of products which are functionally interchangeable, and secondly, a
determination as to whether those products are actually in competition. See Note,
The Market: A Concept in Antitrust, 54 COLUAT. L. REV. 580, 585-94 (1954).
26.'351 U.S. at 400.
27. Id. at 404.
It has also been suggested that the princilpal case has adopted the theory of
"workable competition" as a guide in determining the existence of a monopoly.
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While economists agree with the use of cross-elasticity of demand
as a tool in determining the relevant market,28 some disagree with the
manner of its application in the principal case, for they not only con-
sider the responsiveness of the consumer to price changes in cello-
phane but also the reaction of other sellers. In other words, if the
other wrapping materials had actually been in competition with cello-
phane, i.e., were the cross-elasticity of demand high, the prices of
these materials would have followed any price cut by cellophane to
prevent its incursion upon their markets. The facts demonstrated
that while cellophane reduced its price over a period of years, none of
the other wrapping materials followed a similar pattern. It is argued
that either the sellers of other wrapping materials did not feel the
effect of the price changes, i.e., the cross-elasticity of demand was low,
or these sellers were already selling at cost and were unable to meet
the price change. Thus, these economists conclude that defendant
could price cellophane independently, which is indicative of possessing
Stocking, Ti Rare of Reason, Workable Competition, and Monopoly, 64 YALE L.J.
1107, 1136 (1955); Stocking & Mueller, supra note 1, at 29. See also Mason,
supra note 19, at 1272. Though vague and indefinite it has been described as the
economist's concept of public policy, i.e., a formulation of those conditions which
would provide the basis for a policy that would assure to society the advantages
of a competitive economy. REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S NATIONAL COiI-
MITTEE TO STUDY THE ANTITRUST LAWS 320 (1955). See also Schwartz's dissent to
this report, supra note 20. More specifically, the concept is said to require "a
fairly large number of sellers and buyers, no one of whom occupies a large share
of the market, the absence of collusion among either group, and the possibility
of market entry by new firms." Mason, supra note 19, at 1268. For a more
extensive discussion of the concept of "workable competition," see REPORT OF THE
ATTORNEY GENERAL'S NATIONAL COMMITTEE TO STUDY THE ANTITRUST LAWS
324-36 (1955). See also Clark, Toward a Concept of Workable Competition, 30
AM. EcoN. REv. 241 (1940) ; Oppenheim, supra note 20, at 1187-88. The concept
of "workable competition" was advanced as a more realistic approach to actual
conditions in our economy after a realization by the economists that the classical
concept of pure competition was divorced from reality. See Stocking, supra at
1 109; Oppenheim, supra note 20, at 1183. If "workable competition" were found
to exist in the market, the adovcates of this concept would find that no monopoly
existe(l within the meaning of the Sherman Act. See Oppenheim, supra note 20,
at 118 298 for an excellent discussion of the concept and its effect. See also
Stocking, sifpra at 1107 n.1, for a bibliography of those who have endorsed this
concept,
Several economists have sharply criticized the use of this theory as a tool for
enforcement of the Sherman Act. See Stocking, supra at 21-25 for a summary of
the criticisms of these economists. Two principal criticisms advanced are that
the concept is vague in not establishing any definite criteria for effective enforce-
ment of the antitrust laws, and that its emphasis upon inter-industry competition
is consistent With a fully monopolized economy. The latter criticism points out
that several industries could be monopolized 100% and yet be in competition with
one another. See Adams, supra note 20, at 362-70. Although the majority opinion
purportedly rejected the theory of "interindustry competition," 351 U.S. at 393,
the dissenting opinion, recognizing Adams' argument, maintained that in fact this
theory was adopted by the majority. 351 U.S. at 423-24.
Finally, it should be noted that if the Alcoa case did in fact hold that "mere
siz," violates § 2, see note 20 suipra, it appears that the case would be severely
restricted by the adoption of the concept of "workable competition" as a guide for
antitrust enforcement. See Schwartz, supra note 20, at 40-49.
28. CHAMBERLIN, MONOPOLY AND COMPETITION AND THIm RFGULATIoN 256
(1954); Stocking & Mueller, supra note 1, at 54.
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monopoly power. 29 Essentially, it would seem that these economists be-
lieve that the application of cross-elasticity of demand should include,
where it is found that other sellers do not respond to defendant's price
cuts, an examination of the production costs of the various alternative
products, which examination was considered so important in the Corn
Products case and again suggested in the Alcoa decision.3 0
The Court in the principal case, through the enunciation of the rule
of "reasonable interchangeability," has attempted to establish a more
definite criterion for determining the inclusion of alternative products
within the relevant market and has also attempted to introduce the
use of economic methods of analysis to aid in the solution of this
problem. The utilization of cross-elasticity of demand as set forth by
the Court provides a method for determining the existence of competi-
tion among alternative products. The existence of such competition
was considered essential to the inclusion of substitute products within
the relevant market by the court in the Corn Products case.31 In the
application of this method, however, the Court did not consider the
costs of production of the other flexible wrapping materials. The logic
of Judge Hand justifying consideration of this factor 32 appears sound
and should not be ignored. In the principal case, while the price of
cellophane was high enough so that it appeared to be in competition
with other flexible wrapping materials, it is quite possible that de-
fendant had an advantage in its cost of production which it decided
to exploit. That is, defendant may have been able to lower prices much
further and still have enjoyed a reasonable return but instead decided
to maintain high prices and enjoy monopolistic profits to the extent of
the cost differential.
33
Finally, if the principal case is an example of the complexity of the
29. Stocking & Mueller, supra note 1, at 55-57. The Court in the principal
case appears to have been aware of this approach to the use of cross-elasticity.
351 U.S. at 398 n.26. For a criticism of Stocking & Mueller's article, see Dirlam
& Seltzer, The Cellophane Labyrinth, 1 ANTITRUST BULL. 633 (1956). A reply
to this criticism is found in Stocking, On the Concept of Workable Competitf'n
as an Antitrust Guide, 2 ANTITRUST BULL. 3 (1956).
30. See text supported by notes 14-15 & 17-18 supra.
31. See text supported by note 14 supra. Since the principal case would include
within the relevant market those products which are foundto be in competition,
it seems clear that if the problem of the Alcoa case were presented to the Court
today it would include "secondary" aluminum within the relevant market
inasmuch as it competed with "virgin" aluminum. See text supported by note 19
supra.
32. See text supported by note 15 supra.
33. The high profits enjoyed by defendant, see Stocking, supra note 1, at 59;
351 U.S. at 420-23 (dissenting opinion), possibly indicate that defendant's prices
were much higher than its costs. No evidence was presented to the Court, how-
ever, which compared defendant's rate of return with that of producers of other
flexible wrapping materials. 351 U.S. at 404. This may explain why the Court
did not consider the costs of production of the various wrapping materials.
It has been stated that the Court probably did not intend that the test of
reasonable interchangeability should include products within the relevant market
regardless of their production costs. Turner, supra note 9, at 308-09.
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antitrust cases which will be coming before the courts in the future,
the establishment of an administrative agency to enforce these laws
might well provide a better means of enforcement than the courts.
Such a board would be better equipped to gather and analyze economic
data, would eventually develop economic and legal experts familiar
with the problems arising out of antitrust prosecutions, and what is
more important, would develop a uniform policy in the enforcement of
the antitrust laws3 4
CRIMINAL LAw-POWER OF A TRIAL COURT TO MODIFY A VERDICT
State v. Odom, 292 S.W.2d 23 (Tenn. 1956)
The jury found the defendant guilty of murder in the first degree.
He moved for a new trial, and after a hearing on the motion, the trial
judge found that the evidence was insufficient to support the verdict
and entered judgment modifying the degree of the offense to murder
in the second degree. On certiorari" the appellate court reversed and
directed a new trial holding that where the evidence does not support
the verdict the limit of the trial judge's authority, and his duty, is to
order a new trial.2
'4. See 118 F. Supp. at 213 where Judge Leahy states that there is much
ai gument as to the interpretation and enforcement of the antitrust laws and that
"excellence of corporate function . . . calls for a critical re-examination by the
Congress, after a half-a-century of the enforcement of the Sherman and allied
Acts."
For judicial suggestions that courts and judges may not be capable of handling
masses of economic data, see Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293,
:3 to n.1:3 (1948) ; United States v. United Shoe Mach. Co., 110 F. Supp. 295, 345
n.2 (D. Mass. 1952). In the principal case, the success of the defense may be at-
tributed to the tremendous amount of evidence which defendant produced in prov-
nig the existence of competition, an approach which corporations in the future
might very well take to heart. For a summary of the extent of defendant's evi-
dence, see 118 F. Supp. at 198. The government, on the other hand, failed to offer
any guides for determining degree of market control. Id. at 196.
It has been suggested that a panel of economic experts be provided for the
judge. Clark, The Orientation of Antitrust Policy, 40 Ai. ECON. REv. 93, 98
(1910); Newnan, The Place of Economic and Market Analysis in Antitrust Ad-
ministration, 1 ANTITRUST BULL. 743, 752 (1956). In United States v. United
Shoe Mach. Co., supra, an economist, disguised as a law clerk, served as economic
adlvisor to Judge Wyzanski. Newman, supra at 746.
See also Kansas City Star Co. v. United States, 25 U.S.L. WEEx 1117 (8th Cir.
Jan. 23}, 1957) (Citing the principal case, defendant argued for a broad inter-
pretation of the relevant market. The court, however, concluded that broadcasting
stations, newsreels, topical books, and other specialty items were not competing,
in the t ue sense of the word, with defendant newspaper.).
1. The defendant sought dismissal of the state's petition on the ground that the
state was precluded from an appeal in a criminal case. The court, citing TENN.
Cor)E ANN. §§ 40-3401, 40-3404 (1955), held that the state was precluded from
appeal in Tennessee only when the trial had resulted in an acquittal. State v.
Odom, 292 S.W.2d 23, 24 (Tenn. 1956).
For a general discussion of the right of a state to appeal in criminal cases, see
Miller, Appeals by tMe State in Criminal Cases, 36 YALE L.J. 486 (1927); Note,
47 YALn L.J. 489 (1938); Comment, 23 WASH. U.L.Q. 439 (1938).
2. State v. Odom, 292 S.W.2d 23 (Tenn. 1956).
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